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Positive confirmation bias in the acquisition of information
Martin Jones1 and Robert Sugden2
Abstract   An experiment is reported which tests for positive confirmation bias in a setting in which
individuals choose what information to buy, prior to making a decision.  The design – an adaptation of
Wason’s selection task – reveals the use that subjects make of information after buying it.  Strong
evidence of positive confirmation bias, in both information acquisition and information use, is found; and
this bias is found to be robust to experience.  It is suggested that the bias results from a pattern of
reasoning which, although producing sub-optimal decisions, is internally coherent and which is self-
reinforcing.
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2Traditionally, economics has assumed that economic agents are rational optimizers.  This assumption has
often been casually defended by means of the argument that, by repeated experience of market
transactions, agents will learn to optimize.  Recently, however, economists have begun to investigate and
to theorize about the actual mechanisms by which individuals learn, and to ask whether these mechanisms
induce learning trajectories which converge on optimizing behaviour (e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995; Börgers,
1996; Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Cubitt and Sugden, 1998).  Our paper is a contribution to this larger
enterprise.
Many psychologists have proposed that human reasoning is subject to positive confirmation bias.
 This is a tendency, when testing an existing belief, to search for evidence which could confirm that
belief, rather than for evidence which could disconfirm it.1  In general, both kinds of evidence are relevant
for appraising the validity of a belief; there is bias if, relative to norms of valid reasoning, excessive effort
is devoted to the search for confirming evidence.  If positive confirmation bias is a fundamental property
of the processes of inference and learning used by human beings, then we might expect it to impact on
the decisions that economic agents make in relation to the acquisition of information.  As a result, there
might be systematic biases in economic learning; for example, an agent who repeatedly faces the same set
of options might retain the false belief that a particular option was optimal, even after long exposure to
evidence which, rationally interpreted, would indicate the contrary.
The primary objective of the research reported in this paper is to test for the existence of positive
confirmation bias in a controlled experimental setting in which individuals choose what information to
buy, prior to making a decision.  The design of our experiment is modelled on Wason’s (1968) selection
task.  This task, in various guises, is the paradigm most used by experimental psychologists when
investigating positive confirmation.  However, in the forms in which it has been used up to now, the
selection task is not a decision-making problem in the economic sense.  Experimental subjects have simply
been asked to say what information they would need to gather in order to be sure of the truth or falsity of
3a particular statement; they have not been asked to think about the costs of acquiring information or about
the benefits of using it.  This feature of the existing evidence may explain why economists have shown
much less interest in positive confirmation bias than in many other experimentally-observed ‘anomalies’,
which can be interpreted as violations of standard theories of decision-making.  Our experiment reveals a
pattern of information-gathering behaviour which contravenes the fundamental principles of Bayesian
decision theory.
A related limitation of previous investigations of positive confirmation is that they do not reveal
what use individuals make of information after they have gathered it.  Existing evidence from selection
tasks suggests that individuals seek certain kinds of information which, in the framework of a theory of
rationality, is valueless.  The implications of such behaviour for an economic theory of learning depend
crucially on whether irrelevant information is simply ignored in subsequent decision-making or is treated
as if it were relevant.  The use to which irrelevant information is put also has implications for individuals’
ability to learn by experience that such information is not worth collecting.  Our experiment investigates
the use made of information and the effect of experience on information-gathering and information-using
behaviour.  In the light of our findings, we shall suggest that positive confirmation bias may be robust to
experience.
1.  The Wason selection task: existing theory and evidence
The original selection task (Wason, 1968; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972) is deceptively simple in its
design.  A typical experiment uses a layout of four double-sided cards.  Subjects are told that each card
has a letter on one side and a number on the other, but they can see only the upper faces of the four
cards.  These show ‘A’, ‘D’, ‘4’ and ‘7’.  Each subject is asked to consider the following ‘rule’, as
applied to the four cards:  ‘If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other
side’.  The instruction takes the form: ‘Your task is to say which of the cards you need to turn over to
4find out whether the rule is true or false.’  The two most common responses are the ‘A’ card alone, and
the ‘A’ and ‘4’ cards in combination.  The correct answer to the question posed is, of course, the
combination of ‘A’ and ‘7’.  The frequently-chosen ‘4’ card can provide no information which is relevant
to the issue of whether the rule is true or false.  Notice, however, that the ‘A’ and ‘4’ cards are the ones
that are capable of providing evidence which confirms the rule: by turning over either of these cards, the
subject may find a card with a vowel on one side and an even number on the other.  In contrast, the ‘7’
card can only disconfirm the rule (i.e. by revealing a card which has a vowel on one side but not an even
number on the other).  In this sense, the evidence from the selection task can be interpreted as consistent
with positive confirmation bias.  This is Wason’s own interpretation of his results.
From now on, we will use a more general notation to describe selection task experiments.  We
shall say that the cards have labels on each side.  The meanings of these labels are the propositions p, q,
¬p and ¬q, where ¬ is the logical operator ‘not’.  We treat propositions (e.g. ‘the card has a vowel on one
side’) as subject to the rules of logic.  However, we treat the labels themselves (e.g. « A ») as objects,
such as strings of letters, which are distinct from their meanings.  Such objects will be enclosed by
guillemets (« ... »).
The subject is asked to test the truth or falsity of the statement « If [p], then [q] ».  Here the
guillemets signify that the statement is to be understood as a string of words.  The square brackets around
p and q signify that in the statement actually presented to the subject, labels which mean p and q are used.
 The meaning of the statement is the proposition p Þ q.  The distinction between statements and
propositions is important, because we need to be able to distinguish between the two statements «If [p],
then [q] » and « If [¬q], then [¬p] », even though those statements have equivalent meanings.
The subject’s response will be described by the set of cards which she opts to turn over. 
Usually, we shall identify the four cards simply by their upper faces.  In this notation, the most common
responses are {p} and {p, q} while the correct response is the set of informative cards {p, ¬q}. 
Occasionally, we shall use the notation <g, h> to denote a card whose upper face is g and whose lower
5face is h.  (Here and throughout the paper, g, h Î S where S = {p, q, ¬p, ¬q}.)  In this latter notation, a
card whose upper face is g but whose lower face is unknown or unspecified will be denoted by <g, #>.
Since the publication of Wason’s findings, there has been an explosive growth of literature on the
subject.  The replicability of Wason’s original result is not in dispute, but how it should be interpreted
remains a matter of debate.  This debate has been informed by a large number of selection task
experiments in which different modifications have been made to the original design; the theoretical
problem has been to explain why some versions of the experiment induce the incorrect responses {p} and
{p, q} while other versions facilitate the correct response {p, ¬q}.  In the following subsections we
outline some of the most important hypotheses that have been proposed to account for the evidence.  A
secondary objective of our experiment is to try to discriminate between these explanations.
1.1  Matching
Evans (1972) challenges the claim that the results of selection task experiments are evidence of positive
confirmation bias.  His theory proposes that there is a matching bias, such that subjects in the selection
task experiment tend to choose whichever cards happen to be named in the statement to be tested,
ignoring negations.  Thus, faced with the statement « If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an
even number on the other side », subjects simply respond by choosing those cards which show vowels or
even numbers.  Matching is not interpreted as a form of reasoning, but as a mental processing fault
resulting from an overload of the subject’s cognitive and perceptive abilities.  This hypothesis implies that
subjects’ responses can be changed by rephrasing the statement, introducing negations but preserving its
meaning.  For example, if the statement is rephrased as « If a card has a vowel on one side, then it does
not have an odd number on the other », subjects will tend to choose those cards which show vowels and
odd numbers; this would be the correct response, but not chosen by virtue of its correctness. 
Subsequent research has confirmed that matching bias does occur (Evans and Lynch, 1973; Manktelow
and Evans, 1979).  We shall discriminate between positive confirmation and matching bias by looking for
consistency between subjects’ strategies for gathering information and their strategies for using it.  Such
6consistency, if found, would suggest that subjects were engaging in reasoning rather than suffering from
mental overload.
1.2  Realism 
The original selection task was formulated in highly abstract terms.  It has been suggested that the correct
response might be facilitated by adding thematic content to the task, so that the statement is more readily
intelligible to subjects.  This can be done by making p and q refer to less abstract entities than letters and
numbers, and by providing a cover story which accounts for the statement and gives some point to the
selection task.  The first experimentalists to investigate the effects of thematic content were Johnson-
Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi (1972), who proposed that the crucial variable was the realism of the cover
story, as viewed by the subject.  Their findings supported the hypothesis that realistic cover stories
facilitate the correct response.  Our experiment tests the effects of using cover stories with different
degrees of realism.
1.3  Pragmatic reasoning schemata
Following the work of Johnson-Laird et al, subsequent research has shown that while some cover stories
tend to induce the correct response, others do not (e.g. Manktelow and Evans, 1979; Griggs and Cox,
1982; Reich and Ruth 1982).  It now seems that realism and familiarity may not be the most important
facilitating factors.  A theory of pragmatic reasoning schemata, put forward by Cheng and Holyoak
(1985), is increasingly gaining acceptance as an explanation of the effects of cover stories.
A pragmatic reasoning schema is a set of abstract, generalized, context-sensitive rules which can
be applied to a particular class of problems.  These rules are ‘pragmatic’ in the sense that they are non-
logical; they are used in place of logic because of the latter’s relative complexity.  By setting a context for
a selection task, thematic material can determine which schema (if any) the subject invokes. Cheng and
Holyoak propose that there are deontic schemata of obligation and permission which are particularly
effective in facilitating the correct response to the selection task.  A proposition p Þ q is an obligation if
7it takes the form ‘If action p¢ is performed, then condition q¢ is obligatory’ (e.g. ‘If a person is drinking
beer, then that person must be over 18’).2  Cheng and Holyoak propose that individuals use schemata
which facilitate the correct response in the selection task if the cover story is deontic.
On this hypothesis, the realism and familiarity of the cover story are irrelevant; what matters is its
deontic structure.  Cover stories, however realistic and familiar, will not facilitate the correct response if
the p Þ q proposition is a causal relationship (e.g. ‘If a person has drunk whisky, then that person has a
high blood alcohol level’) or a neutral (i.e. non-deontic, non-causal, non-tautological) material conditional
(e.g. ‘If a person in this room is male, then that person smokes’).  There is now a considerable body of
evidence that deontic cover stories facilitate the correct response, particularly if the subject is asked to
adopt the viewpoint of the enforcer of a deontic rule (e.g. Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989;
Manktelow and Over, 1991).  A possible explanation for this finding is that, to enforce a rule, one has to
look for violations of it – that is, to look for disconfirmations.  In contrast, when considering whether an
« If [p], then [q] » statement is true, people may be predisposed to look for confirmations.  Our
experiment will test the differential effects of neutral, causal and deontic cover stories.
1.4 ‘Bayesian’ reasoning
The selection task, as usually formulated, is amenable to Bayesian analysis only in the most trivial sense. 
Whatever the subject’s priors, he can be certain of the truth or falsity of the proposition p Þ q by turning
over the p and ¬q cards.  Provided that all relevant prior probabilities lie strictly between 0 and 1, he
cannot have posterior subjective certainty about the truth or falsity of the proposition unless he turns over
both of these cards.  Since he is asked to say which cards he needs to turn over to find out whether the
statement is true or false, {p, ¬q} is the unambiguously correct response, irrespective of his (diffuse)
priors.
However, some commentators have used Bayesian analysis to argue that behaviour in the
selection task is guided by heuristics which, although inappropriate for that task, are well-adapted to many
real-world problems.  An interpretation of the selection task evidence along these lines is offered by
8Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983).  A similar argument is presented by Klayman and Ha (1987). 
Klayman and Ha consider the heuristics that people might use to test hypotheses of the form ‘p tends to
be associated with q’, which apply across a wide domain (for example: ‘smoking is a cause of lung
cancer’).  Relevant information for assessing the truth of such a hypothesis can be found by sampling any
of the cases p, q, ¬p, ¬q; but if the unconditional probabilities of p and q are low, samples of p (taking a
sample of smokers and finding how many of them contract lung cancer) and q (taking a sample of people
with lung cancer and finding how many of them are smokers) are more informative than samples of ¬p
and ¬q.  Thus, a heuristic which prompts people to test such hypotheses by sampling cases of p and q is
well-adapted to many real problems.3, 4   
Notice that this argument does not imply that the choice of p and q in Wason’s selection task is
rational in the Bayesian sense.  Nor does it imply that similar deviations from norms of rationality are
absent in real-world decision-making.  The argument offers an explanation of why positive confirmation
bias occurs: the bias is a by-product of heuristics which, on the whole, work reasonably well.  To this
extent, the argument has little bearing on the design on experiments such as ours, which are designed to
test whether positive confirmation bias exists. 
However, these Bayesian lines of reasoning point to the potential significance of subjects’ prior
beliefs about probabilities.  In particular, whether the frequently-chosen p card has more or less
information content than the rarely-chosen ¬q card depends on subjects’ priors.  Our experiment is
designed so as to achieve as much control as possible over subjects’ priors.
2.  Experimental design: principles
The principal objective of our experiment is to test for positive confirmation bias in a setting in which
individuals make information-acquisition decisions which have real financial consequences for them.  In
this section, we explain the broad principles of the design; its practical implementation is described in
Section 5.
9The experiment uses a pack of double-sided cards; each card is labelled so that it has (strictly:
has a label whose meaning is) p or ¬p on one side and q or ¬q on the other.  The up/down orientation of
each card is fixed during the experiment, and so there are effectively eight possible types of card <g, h>. 
For each subject and for each task, the total number of cards in the pack is the same; we denote this
number m.  The composition of the pack is determined by a random process, independently for each
subject and for each task.  This process uses a parameter a Î (0, 1), which is constant across subjects
and tasks.  The type of each of the m cards is determined independently; using s(<g, h>) to denote the
probability that each card is of type <g, h>, the process is described by s(<p, q>) = s(<q, p>) = s(<¬p,
¬q>) = s(<¬q, ¬p>) = a/4 and s(<p, ¬q>) = s(<¬p, q>) = s(<q, ¬p>) = s(<¬q, p>) = (1 - a)/4.
It is useful to define a contraposition function f(.) such that f(p) = ¬q, f(q) = ¬p, f(¬p) = q,
f(¬q) = p.  We extend the domain of f(.) to the power set of S by defining f(A) = {f(g): g ÎA} for all A Í
S.  Notice that for all g, h: s(<g, h>) = s(<f[g], f[h]>).  This property, which we shall call contrapositive
symmetry, is important for our hypothesis tests.  One of its implications is that, in a Bayesian analysis in
which card frequencies are used as priors, there is no systematic difference between the information
contents of the lower faces of the p and ¬q cards.
The subject inspects the pack before any cards are dealt from it.  Four cards are then dealt at
random, subject to the constraint that these cards are <p, #>, <q, #>, <¬p, #> and <¬q, #>.  The subject
is asked to consider the statement « Every card in the sample which is [p] is also [q] » or, for short,
«Every [p] is [q] ».  She then chooses which if any of these cards to turn over; she has to pay a fixed
cost per card turned over.  After she has made this choice, the cards she has chosen are turned over (all
together: it is not permitted to turn over one card and then, in the light of the information it provides, to
decide whether to turn over another).  She then makes the judgment that the statement is ‘true’ or ‘false’.
 Finally the remaining cards are turned over and she receives a fixed reward if and only if her judgment
was in fact correct.
The cost and the reward are described to the subject in terms of ‘points’.  The subject starts the
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experiment (which may include more than one task) with an endowment of points sufficient to guarantee
that she ends with a non-negative total.  At the end of the experiment, she enters a lottery in which the
prize is some fixed amount of money and in which the probability of winning that prize is proportional to
the total number of points credited to her.  Thus, if the subject is rational in the sense of expected utility
theory (and given the trivial assumption that a money prize is preferred to nothing), she will seek to
maximize the expected number of points scored in each task.  More generally, the rule of maximizing
expected points is implied by any theory of rational choice in which higher probabilities of preferred
outcomes are preferred to lower probabilities of the same outcomes.  Such preferences will be called
dominance-respecting.  As a normalization, we define the subject’s payoff for a task as the score in points
divided by the points value of the reward.  We use c to denote the cost in points of turning over a card as
a ratio of the points value of the reward.  Thus, the subject loses c units of payoff for each card turned
over and gains one unit of payoff if her judgment is correct.
This binary lottery incentive system has been widely used in experimental economics as a means
of inducing risk-neutral preferences.  In a recent paper, Selten, Sadrieh and Abbink (1999) have proposed
the hypothesis that, in fact, experimental subjects are at least as risk-averse with respect to payoffs that
are denominated in terms of lottery tickets as they are with respect to payoffs that are denominated in
money; and they have presented supporting evidence.  If this hypothesis is true, we cannot assume that
subjects in our experimental design are risk-neutral with respect to points.  But, as we explain in Section
4, our null hypotheses are independent of subjects’ attitudes to risk.  Thus, such a failure of risk neutrality
would not confound our tests for positive confirmation bias.
The subject’s task can be analysed according to Bayesian decision theory and, as a benchmark,
this analysis is presented in Section 3.  However, it is not our objective to test the hypothesis that our
subjects are rational Bayesians.  Even for someone who understands the principles of decision theory, the
expected payoffs of the various strategies can be worked out only by counting the different kinds of
cards in the pack and then doing a certain amount of analysis and computation.  It is safe to assume that
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most of our subjects would not have known how to work out an optimal strategy from the information at
their disposal.  The mechanism of dealing the cards from a pack which the subject has inspected is used
to secure experimental control over subjects’ information; we do not need to assume that subjects’
subjective beliefs about the lower faces of the four cards correspond with the relative frequencies of the
different types of cards in the pack.
Our objective is to test whether people’s decision-making exhibits a particular systematic bias,
namely positive confirmation bias.  Accordingly, we need null hypotheses which permit the widest
possible range of behaviour – rational or irrational – while excluding those kinds of behaviour that would
result from positive confirmation bias.  After the Bayesian analysis, we shall explain our null and
alternative hypotheses.
3. Bayesian analysis
We define a strategy as the combination of a set of cards to be turned over and a rule which conditions
the subject’s judgment on the information she receives.  We evaluate alternative strategies in terms of their
expected payoffs.  As explained in Section 2, it is an implication of Bayesian decision theory that a
rational subject will maximize expected payoff in each task; since this is a theorem, not an empirical
hypothesis, it remains true even if, in fact, the binary lottery system fails to induce risk neutrality.
First, we eliminate those strategies which can be shown not to maximize expected payoff for any
composition of the pack and for any c > 0.  In a Bayesian analysis, the probability that the statement is
true is independent of the downward faces of the uninformative cards <q, #> and <¬p, #>.  If both the
informative cards <p, #> and <¬q, #> are turned over, the truth or falsity of the statement is known with
certainty.  If only one of the informative cards is turned over and is found to disconfirm the statement
(i.e. if the card is <p, ¬q> or <¬q, p>), then the statement is certainly false.  If only one informative card
is turned over and it fails to disconfirm the statement, then the probability that the statement is true must
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be revised upwards (provided the prior probability was non-zero).  From these propositions it is
straightforward to deduce that if a strategy maximizes expected payoff, it must be one of the following
five qualitatively rational strategies:
S1: Turn over no cards; judge statement true.
S2: Turn over no cards; judge statement false.
S3: Choose {p}; judge statement true iff lower face of chosen card is q.
S4: Choose {¬q}; judge statement true iff lower face of chosen card is ¬p.
S5: Choose {p, ¬q}; judge statement true iff (lower face of p card is q and lower face of ¬q
card is ¬p).
Which of these strategies is optimal depends on the composition of the pack and on the value of
c.  In our experiment, the parameter values are set at m = 100, a = 0.8, and c = 0.125.  For these values,
and for the average pack of cards in which the proportion of cards of each type <g, h> is equal to the
prior probability s(<g, h>), it can be shown that the expected payoffs of strategies S1, ..., S5 are
respectively 0.64, 0.36, 0.715, 0.715, and 0.75.  In this sense, the objectively optimal strategy is S5: since
this requires {p, ¬q} to be chosen, our design can be thought of as a Bayesian analogue of the original
selection task.
As these calculations show, the expected payoff from S5 is only slightly greater than that of
several other strategies.  This is an unavoidable feature of our design.  From their knowledge of the
composition of the pack, subjects can assess the prior probability that the statement is true; so even if no
cards are turned over, the judgment of a Bayesian subject must have at least a 0.5 probability of being
correct, whatever the value of a .  It is essential that subjects perceive there to be a significant cost to
turning each card, since otherwise there would be no reason not to turn them all over.  The presence of
this cost reduces the expected payoff from turning over the two informative cards.  In consequence, the
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expected payoff from turning over two cards cannot be very much greater than both the expected payoff
from turning over one card and that of turning over none.  This property of expected payoffs would be
problematic if  the experiment were designed to test Bayesian rationality.  But, to repeat: that is not our
objective.  Our objective to test for positive confirmation bias.  Our null hypothesis is not Bayesian
rationality; it is the absence of that bias.
4 The principal hypotheses to be tested in the experiment
In this section we explain our approach to testing for positive confirmation bias, both in subjects’ choices
of cards and in their subsequent judgements about the truth or falsity of the statement.
 4.1  Choice of cards
We work in a framework of stochastic choice, applied to a given subject, for given values of the
parameters m, a and c, and for a given labelling of the cards.  Interpreting p, q, ¬p, ¬q as the four cards,
we define a function p(.) from the power set of S to the interval [0, 1].  For each A Í S (i.e. for each set
of cards which might be chosen), p(A) is interpreted as a decision probability: it is the probability
(assessed prior to the deal of the four cards) that the subject chooses A when testing the statement «
Every [p] is [q] ».  Stochastic variation in choice is to be interpreted as resulting from errors or
imprecision in individuals’ preferences and beliefs (Loomes and Sugden, 1995) as well as from the effects
of random variation in the composition of the pack of cards.  By modelling choice as stochastic, we allow
for the possibility that subjects’ behaviour is partly random.  Our tests look for patterns in that behaviour
that cannot be explained by random variation.
Now consider the same subject, the same parameter values, and the same labelling of the cards,
but a different statement.  Specifically, the statement is «Every [p¢] is [q¢]», where p¢ = f(p) and q¢= f(q).
 We use T¢ to denote the task of testing this statement; the task of testing «Every [p] is [q]» is denoted by
T.  We define a function p¢(.) from the power set of S¢ = {p¢, q¢, ¬p¢, ¬q¢} to [0, 1], specifying decision
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probabilities for task T¢.  We shall say that p is isomorphic with p¢, q with q¢ and so on.  Similarly, two
sets A Í S and A¢ Í S¢ are isomorphic if A can be transformed into A¢ by substituting p¢ for p, q¢ for q,
and so on.  For example, suppose the cards are labelled «vowel» or «consonant» on one side and «even»
or «odd» on the other, and that T is the task of testing «Every vowel card is an even-numbered card»;
thus p({p}) is the probability of choosing just the «vowel» card in T.  Then T¢ is the task of testing
«Every odd-numbered card is a consonant card» and  p¢({p¢}) is the probability of choosing just the
«odd» card in T¢.
Notice that the tasks T and T¢ are identical except for the wordings of the statements: the two
statements have logically equivalent meanings.  Thus, irrespective of the composition of the pack, and
irrespective of the subject’s attitude to risk, any theory which considers only the logical structure of
decision problems and which ignores the way those problems are framed must imply that the decision
probabilities associated with any given set of cards (defined in terms of their labels) is the same for both
tasks.  That is, for all A Í S and A¢Í S¢ such that A and A¢ are isomorphic: p(A) = p¢(f[A¢]).  We shall
call this condition cross-task contraposition neutrality.  If there is positive confirmation bias, however,
cross-task contraposition neutrality will be violated.  This is because the cards which can confirm the
statements in the two tasks are different.  (Using the example of the preceding paragraph: «vowel» and
«even» can confirm the statement in T, while «odd» and «consonant» can confirm the statement in T¢).
Recall that the process which determines the composition of the pack satisfies contrapositive
symmetry.  This property implies that the isomorphism between T and T¢ extends to card frequencies. 
More precisely, for all g, h, g¢, h¢ such that g¢ is isomorphic with g and h¢ is isomorphic with h: s(<g, h>)
= s(<g¢, h¢>).  Thus, the only difference between A in task T and the isomorphic set A¢ in task T¢ is in
respect of the labelling of the cards.  Any theory which considers only the logical structure of decision
problems and which ignores framing and labelling must imply that the decision probabilities associated
with isomorphic sets are equal.  That is, for all A Í S and A¢ Í S¢ such that A and A¢ are isomorphic:
p(A) = p¢(A¢).  Again, this result is independent of the subject’s attitudes to risk.   We shall call this
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condition labelling neutrality; violations of this condition are labelling effects.
One possible source of labelling effects is discussed by Oaksford and Chater (1994): subjects
might use their background knowledge about the cover story, rather than their observations of the
distribution of cards in the pack, to form priors.  For example, take the case of the statement «Every
person who is under 18 is drinking a soft drink».  If the cover story is about a bar, the subject might
believe that the majority of customers would be both over 18 and drinking alcohol, in which case the
«under 18» card would be more informative than the «drinking alcohol» card.
If decision probabilities satisfy both cross-task contraposition neutrality and labelling neutrality,
then for all A Í S: p(A) = p(f[A]).  We shall call this property within-task contraposition neutrality.  Our
principal test for bias looks at subjects’ responses to a single task, and uses within-task contraposition
neutrality as the null hypothesis.5  The alternative hypothesis is that there are systematic divergences from
this form of neutrality in the direction that would be consistent with positive confirmation bias.  Roughly,
our alternative hypothesis is that, other things being equal, the potentially confirming cards p and q are
chosen more frequently than other cards, ‘other things being equal’ being interpreted in terms of within-
task contraposition neutrality.
More precisely, for any given task, consider the following sets of cards: A1 = {p},  A2 = {q}, A3
= {p, q}, A4 = {p, q, ¬p}, A5 = {p, q, ¬q}.  Then f(A1) = {¬q},  f(A2) = {¬p}, f(A3) = {¬p, ¬q}, f(A4) =
{q, ¬p, ¬q}, and f(A5) = {p, ¬p, ¬q}.  The null hypothesis implies that p(Ai) = p(f[Ai]) for i = 1, ..., 5,
and hence that Si p(Ai) = Si p(f[Ai]).  Notice that for each i, after eliminating cards which are common to
both Ai and f(Ai), Ai contains only potentially confirming cards while f(Ai) contains only cards which are
not potentially confirming.  (A1, ..., A5 are the only sets of cards for which this is true.)  Thus, our
alternative hypothesis is that for each i, p(Ai) > p(f[Ai]), and hence that Si p(Ai) > Si p(f[Ai]).
This hypothesis is convenient because it applies to individual tasks, rather than requiring
comparisons across tasks.  However, a test of this hypothesis does not discriminate between positive
confirmation bias and labelling effects.  In order to discriminate between these two effects, we investigate
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some pairs of tasks which stand in the same relation to one another as do T and T¢ in the preceding
theoretical discussion.  Using A1¢, ..., A5¢ to denote sets of cards in T¢ which are isomorphic with A1, ...,
A5, it is easy to see that while either Si p(Ai) > Si p(f[Ai]) or Si p¢(Ai) > Si p¢(f[Ai]) could result from
labelling effects, both together could not.  Thus, to accept the alternative hypothesis in relation to both
tasks is to conclude that there is a regularity in subjects’ choices which (i) cannot be explained by any
theory which considers only the logical content of statements and ignores the way they are framed, (ii)
cannot be explained by labelling effects, but (iii) can be explained by positive confirmation bias.
4.2  True/false judgments
In Section 3 we described how a Bayesian agent would revise her beliefs about the truth or falsity of the
statement in the light of information generated by turning over cards.  We now ask in what respects a
subject might be expected to deviate from those Bayesian judgments if she was influenced by positive
confirmation bias.
We will say that a card <p, ¬q> or <¬q, p>, if turned over, is a disconfirmation, while <p, q>
and <q, p> are confirmations; <p, q> is an informative confirmation while <q, p> is an uninformative
one.  Recall that positive confirmation bias is an excessive tendency to seek confirmations when testing
hypotheses; a person who is influenced by this bias is inclined to turn over the <p, #> and <q, #> cards
because these might be the confirmations <p, q> and <q, p>.  If confirmation-seeking is interpreted as
part of a strategy for testing hypotheses, we should expect confirmations – even uninformative ones – to
count in favour of a hypothesis.  Thus, it is a natural extension of the theory of positive confirmation bias
to propose that confirmations increase the subject’s confidence in the truth of the statement.
This hypothesis implies systematic deviations from Bayesian rationality in response to the
information revealed by turning over the <q, #> card (i.e. the card which has the potential to provide
uninformative confirmations).  Let t(C) denote the probability that a given subject makes the judgement
‘true’, conditional on having turned over the set of cards C.  (Here, a ‘card’ is defined by what is on each
side, not just by its upper face.)  Consider any two sets of cards C and D such that <q, p> Î C, <q, ¬p>
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Î D, and C\{<q, p>} = D\{<q, ¬p>}.  Thus, the upper faces of the cards in C and D are identical, and
both include the uninformative card <q, #>; the only difference between their lower faces is that C
contains the confirmation <q, p> while D contains <q, ¬p>.  We suggest that in such a case, a theory of
positive confirmation should predict t(C) > t(D).  We shall test this hypothesis, using t(C) = t(D) as our
null.
5 Experimental design: details
The experiment was carried out at the University of East Anglia in Norwich.  Subjects were recruited on
the campus; most were students, coming from a wide range of course programmes.  The 120 subjects
took part in groups of up to twelve at a time.  Each subject sat a screened computer workstation; there
was no communication between subjects.
In the main part of the experiment, each subject faces a series of seven tasks, each of which has
the general structure described in Section 2.  Before starting these tasks, subjects are given full
instructions about the nature of these tasks, about how points are scored, and about how points will be
converted into chances of winning a prize.  These instructions are given orally, in conjunction with a
series of interactive instruction screens on each subject’s workstation.  This is followed by an example of
the task; subjects work through this example with the help of further oral instructions.  In composing the
instructions, care was taken not to suggest that there was a right way to tackle any task, or to suggest
that any particular strategy was to be preferred to any other.
Next, each subject answers three multiple-choice questions, designed to test her understanding of
the task and of the scoring system.  If a subject gives a wrong answer to any of these questions, further
help is given.  In the event, responses to these questions indicated a high level of understanding of the
instructions.6
Each task is presented by means of a sequence of six screens.  The first, preliminary screen
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presents the cover story and the statement.  The cover story is in two parts.  The background describes
some set of 100 objects.  Each object has two characteristics, each of which can take one of two values;
these correspond with p, ¬p, q, and ¬q.  A mechanism is described which explains how the
characteristics of each object have been written down on the two sides of a card, and how a sample of
four of the 100 cards has been selected.  For example, the background of the most abstract cover story
is:
There is a collection of 100 objects each one of which is either ‘Grue’ or ‘Bleen’.  Also each
object is either ‘Smarge’ or ‘Lall’.  Each object is described on a card with ‘Grue’ or ‘Bleen’
written on one side and ‘Smarge’ or ‘Lall’ written on the other.  A sample of four cards is
selected.
          
The continuation of the cover story introduces the statement in a way which characterizes it as neutral,
deontic or causal.  The statement itself is always expressed as a material conditional, irrespective of
whether it has been explained in neutral, deontic or causal terms.  For example, the neutral continuation of
the ‘Grue’ cover story is:
Look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
             Every object in the sample which is ‘Grue’ is also ‘Smarge’.
The deontic continuation is:
There is a rule which requires that any object which is ‘Grue’ must also be ‘Smarge’.  To find
out if the four objects in the sample are obeying the rule look at whichever cards you wish to
test the statement:
Every object in the sample which is ‘Grue’ is also ‘Smarge’.
All statements take the form «Every ... in the sample which is ... is also ...».  We use this
formulation, instead of the «If ..., then ...» which has been used in many selection task experiments, for
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two reasons.  First, the «If ..., then ...» structure is ambiguous in ordinary language, and could be
mistaken for the biconditional «If and only if ..., then ...».  Second, our formulation makes it explicit that
the statement applies only to the sample of four cards, and not to any larger population (compare Section
1.4).  No negations are used in any statement, so as to avoid any matching bias associated with negation
(compare Section 1.1).
The second screen is the browsing screen.  This screen represents a pack of 100 double-sided
cards in random order, with the properties described in Section 2.  The faces of these cards are labelled to
correspond with the statement (e.g. «Grue», «Bleen», «Smarge» and «Lall»).  The pack is represented as
being spread out on a table with the top card and the edges of the other cards showing.  By using cursor
keys, the subject can highlight the edge of any card; the front and back of that card are then displayed. 
After looking at as many cards as she wishes, the subject moves on to the next screen.  Thus, although
the subject is not given any explicit information about the frequencies of different types of card in the
pack, she has the opportunity to discover these frequencies by inspection if she wishes to do so.
This shuffling screen simply flashes the word ‘shuffling’ to signify that the program is re-
randomizing the order of cards in the pack (while maintaining their up/down orientation).  After a short
interval, the deal screen is shown.  This represents, in visual form, the random selection of <p, #>, <q,
#>,  <¬p, #> and <¬q, #> cards.  Cards are seen to be ‘dealt’ from the top of the pack, with only their
upper faces visible; the first card of each type to be reached is put into the standard four-card layout of
the selection task.  The four cards are placed side by side, working from left to right in the order in which
they are dealt; this randomizes the relative positions of the p, q, ¬p and ¬q cards.  As soon as the four
cards have been dealt, the information on both sides of these cards is printed out.  The subject does not
see the printout until the end of the experiment, when she is given the opportunity to check that the
undersides of the cards were determined before she made any decisions, and have not been changed
since.
  The fifth screen is the choice screen.  The subject sees the upper faces of the four cards dealt
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out in the previous screen, and is asked to choose which cards to turn over.  The statement to be tested is
also displayed.  At this stage, the subject can move freely between the choice screen and the preliminary
screen, and so can refer to the cover story if she wishes.  She must choose all the cards to be turned over
before seeing any of their lower faces.  The subject has been told that there is a cost of one point for
every card turned over, and that the reward for a correct judgment about the truth or falsity of the
statement is eight points.  After she has made her choice, she moves on to the question screen.  This
screen displays both faces of the cards she has chosen to turn over, and the upper faces of the others. 
She is asked to judge whether the statement (which is displayed again) is true or false.
In performing the first six tasks, the subject sees only the five screens we have described so far.
 After making her judgment for the sixth task, the subject moves on to a series of six answer screens, one
for each of the previous tasks.  The answer screen for a task displays both sides of all four cards, along
with the statement and the subject’s true/false judgment.  The text on the screen tells the subject whether
her judgment about the truth or falsity of the statement was right or wrong and if it was wrong, the
reason why it was wrong (in the form «The card with ... on the front had ... on the back»).
Notice that this feature of the design implies that the subject has no feedback on the correctness
of her judgments until she has completed the six tasks.  By not providing such feedback, we ensure that a
subject’s responses to later tasks (in the set of six) are not influenced by her success in earlier tasks. 
However, some degree of cross-task learning is clearly possible, even in the absence of feedback on the
correctness of judgments.7  This is an unavoidable cost of a design in which each subject performs
several tasks.  Such learning, if it occurs, reduces the discriminatory power of our cross-task tests.  But
because the order of tasks is randomized (see Section 6), learning cannot induce systematic confounding
effects. 
The seventh task is a repeat of whichever task the subject faced first.  In this task, the subject
works through all six screens in sequence.  By using this repeated task, our design allows us to investigate
whether a subject’s behaviour is influenced by feedback about the outcomes of her previous choices and
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judgments.
The subject begins the experiment with an endowment of 32 points.  Thus, the total score for the
experiment must lie in the range from 4 to 88; the objectively optimal strategy S5 guarantees a score of
74.  At the end of the experiment, each subject draws a lottery ticket from a set of tickets numbered from
1 to 100; if the ticket number drawn is less than or equal to the number of points scored, the subject wins
£10.
6.  Cover stories and randomizations
All the tasks in the experiment have the same logical structure, with the same parameter values m = 100, a
= 0.8 and c = 0.125.  They differ only in respect of the labelling of the cards, the cover stories, and the
wording of the statement.
The cover stories are presented in full in the Appendix.  There are six basic cover stories, which
we shall identify by the objects which the cards represent.  Three of these – Relatives, Drinkers and
Rivers – are realistic in the sense that they refer to concrete, readily understandable although necessarily
stylized relationships.  The Relatives story is neutral, the Drinkers story is deontic, and the Rivers story is
causal.  Each of these stories is used in two different but isomorphic treatments: the statement in the
contraposed treatment is the contrapositive of that in the standard treatment.  This feature of the design
allows us to control for labelling effects. 
The backgrounds of the other three cover stories – Objects, Diners and Meters – are written so
that each story can be continued in different ways.  Each of these stories has three alternative
continuations – neutral, deontic and causal – which are used in different treatments.  However, for a given
cover story, the statement is the same in all three treatments.  The object of this part of the design is to
allow a controlled test of Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) hypothesis about pragmatic reasoning schemata, in
the context of our design (see Section 1.3).  According to that hypothesis, correct reasoning in selection
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tasks is facilitated if the cover story has a deontic structure, irrespective of the realism of that story.  We
deliberately did not try to make these three cover stories realistic: the Objects story is abstract (it uses
predicates which have no meaning in the English language) while the other two are fanciful.  Cheng and
Holyoak (1989) use similarly fanciful cover stories when testing their hypothesis.
The tasks used in the experiment are summarized in Table 1.  In the ‘schema invoked’ column,
‘variable’ signifies that neutral, deontic and causal versions of the cover story are used in different
treatments.  In the ‘form of statement’ column, ‘variable’ signifies that standard and contraposed
treatments are used in different treatments.  (For these tasks, the entries under ‘p’ and ‘q’ in the Table
refer to the standard treatment.)  Each subject faces six different tasks, presented in random order,
followed by a repeat of the first task.
Leaving aside the seventh task, each subject faces one task involving each of the six cover
stories.  For the variable statement tasks (cover stories 1 to 3), each subject either faces all three tasks in
the standard treatment or faces them all in the contraposed treatment.  For the variable schema tasks
(cover stories 4 to 6), each subject faces one task in the neutral treatment, one in the deontic treatment,
and one in the causal treatment.  Within these constraints, subjects are assigned randomly to treatments.
Each instance in which a subject faces a task will be called a case.  The experiment generates
data for 840 cases.  These cases can be partitioned into seven sets of 120 cases each, such that each set i
= 1, ..., 7 contains those cases in which a subject faces the ith task in her series of seven tasks.  Notice
that our randomization procedures ensure that each of these sets contains a random sample of the entire
set of tasks and treatments.  Thus, we can measure the effect of increases in experience by comparing
aggregated responses for different values of i; we shall call i the level of experience.  Notice also that, for
every given cover story and treatment, subjects facing this task for the first time are randomly distributed
over experience levels 1, ..., 6.  Thus, when making comparisons across tasks it is legitimate to aggregate
across experience levels.
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7.  Results: positive confirmation bias in the choice of cards
Table 2 presents some summary statistics about subjects’ choices of cards.  Each row of data in this
table represents an aggregation across all 120 subjects.  Each of the first six rows aggregates across the
different treatments for a given cover story, while each of the next three rows aggregates across the three
variable-schema cover stories for a given schema.  To avoid double-counting, the data for the different
types of task refer only to the first six tasks faced by each subject.  (Throughout our analysis of the
results, we shall ignore all data relating to the seventh task, except when explicitly considering the effects
of experience.)  Each of the following seven rows of the table aggregates across all tasks for a given level
of experience.
The first column of data shows the number of subjects who made the objectively optimal choice
{p, ¬q}.8  The second column shows the number who made qualitatively rational choices, i.e. who chose
neither of the uninformative cards.  The third column shows the number who chose the p card (either
alone or in conjunction with other cards); the next three columns show corresponding numbers for the
other cards.  The final column shows a test statistic which will be explained later.
Table 3 shows the complete distribution of responses, broken down by type of task and by level
of experience.  Thus, the second column of data shows the frequency with which Æ was chosen, the
third shows the frequency with which {p} was chosen, the seventh shows the frequency with which {p,
q} was chosen, and so on.  The final two columns of Table 3 show the aggregations that are relevant for
our tests of positive confirmation bias.  The penultimate column shows the number of subjects who
chose one of the sets A1, ..., A5, as defined in Section 4.1 (i.e. the sum of the columns marked by *). The
final column shows the number who chose one of the isomorphic sets f(A1), ..., f(A5) (i.e. the sum of the
columns marked by #).
Looking at the column totals in Tables 2 and 3, it can be seen that the most frequent response is
{p, ¬q}, i.e. the set of informative cards; this accounts for 29 per cent of all responses.  Considering
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individual cards, the cards most frequently chosen are p (74 per cent of responses) and ¬q (43 per cent
of responses).  Thus, modal responses are rational in the Bayesian sense.  However, the overall
distribution of responses shows a clear pattern that is consistent with positive confirmation.  After {p,
¬q}, the most frequent responses are Æ (18 per cent), {p, q} (18 per cent), {p} (14 per cent), and {p, q,
¬q} (9 per cent).  Of these, {p, q} and {p} are the classic positive-confirmation responses, while {p, q,
¬q} seems to represent a mix of Bayesian rationality and positive confirmation.  The uninformative but
potentially confirming q card is chosen in 33 per cent of cases.
Recall that the null hypothesis of within-task contraposition neutrality implies that the expected
frequency of Ai responses is equal to that of f(Ai) responses, while positive confirmation bias implies that
former are more frequent than the latter.  A glance at Table 3 is enough to show that this null hypothesis
is decisively rejected.  For every type of task and for every level of experience, the combined frequency
of Ai responses is greater than that of f(Ai) responses.  In every case this difference is significant at the
99 per cent confidence level (for a one-tailed test based on the binomial distribution).  Notice that in the
variable statement tasks, the standard and contraposed treatments produce the same massive asymmetry
between Ai and f(Ai) responses.  Thus, the asymmetries in our data cannot be explained by labelling
effects.  There is, then, overwhelming evidence that subjects’ information-gathering decisions are
systematically biased in favour of information which is potentially confirming.
Despite the strength of this evidence of bias, behaviour seems to have been closer to Bayesian
rationality in our experiment than in many selection task experiments.  A meta-analysis of 34 non-thematic
selection task experiments has shown that the individual cards p, q, Ø p ,Øq were chosen with
frequencies 0.89, 0.62, 0.16 and 0.25 (Oaksford and Chater, 1994, p. 613), as compared with 0.74, 0.34,
0.07 and 0.43 in our experiment.  We are reluctant to read too much into such comparisons, which are
not subject to experimental control.  But it may be worth saying that our design has various properties
which could facilitate Bayesian rationality.  One is the use of thematic material: it is not uncommon for {p,
Øq} to be the modal response to selection tasks when such material is used (e.g. Johnson-Laird et al,
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1972; Cheng and Holyoak, 1985).  Another is the presence of financial incentives, which might induce
subjects to take greater care over their responses.  A third is the framing of the task in terms of a cost per
card turned over.  This might prompt subjects to think about each card separately, and in so doing, to
recognize which cards do and do not have information content.  Finally, our design requires subjects to
use the information that they collect by turning over cards.  By thinking about how different kinds of
information should be used, subjects might come to see which cards are capable of providing useful
information.
8.  Results: comparisons across conditions and experience levels
We have outlined various theories which offer reasons to expect differences in the extent of positive
confirmation bias across tasks and treatments.  We test for such differences by comparing distributions
of responses between types of task.  For these tests, we classify responses into six categories – the five
most common responses, i.e. {p, ¬q}, Æ, {p, q}, {p}, {p, q, ¬q}, and ‘other’.  Taking the most abstract
cover story, Objects, as our datum, we test whether the distribution of responses for each other cover
story is significantly different from that datum.  Similarly, aggregating across the three variable-schema
tasks, we take the neutral treatment as our datum and test whether the distributions of responses for
deontic and causal treatments are significantly different from that.  We also carry out similar tests for the
effects of experience; here, the first task faced is the datum.  Each test uses data from all 120 subjects. 
The final column of Table 2 reports the relevant ?2 statistics (5 degrees of freedom; critical value for 95
per cent confidence is 11.1).
We find no evidence to support Cheng and Holyoak’s hypothesis that responses are different
depending on whether a given statement is interpreted as a neutral, deontic or causal relationship.  Nor do
we find any general tendency for responses to be different depending on whether the cover story is
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abstract, fanciful or realistic.  It is possible that the absence of significant cross-task differences is the
product of cross-task learning (see Section 5).  Nevertheless, our results show that responses can be
affected by the cover story: compared with any of the other stories, Drinkers generates a quite different
pattern of responses.  (For the comparison between Drinkers and Objects, ?2 = 46.75 – an
overwhelmingly significant difference.)  On every criterion – the frequency of {p, ¬q} responses, the
frequency of qualitatively rational responses, the frequency with which each individual card is chosen –
responses to the Drinkers story are closer to Bayesian rationality and show less positive confirmation bias.
 Other researchers have used cover stories about under-age drinking in thematic selection tasks, and they
too have found that this story facilitates the {p, ¬q} response (e.g. Griggs and Cox, 1982; Cheng and
Holyoak, 1985).
Why this particular cover story has such a strong effect is not clear.  It is reasonable to suppose
that, for the young adults who make up the bulk of our subject pool, rules about under-age drinking are
both familiar and salient.  But if familiarity were crucial, one would expect our other realistic cover stories
to have had at least some facilitating effect relative to Objects.  It may be significant that Drinkers is a
deontic cover story, but the results from our variable-schema tasks suggest that a deontic cover story is
not a sufficient condition for facilitation.  Since it would be futile to try to generalize from a sample of
one, all we can safely say on the basis of our evidence is that some cover stories do facilitate the
objectively optimal response, and that Drinkers is one such story.
The chi-squared tests for differences in responses across experience levels within the experiment
show that some process of learning is going on: as the experience level increases, the distribution of
responses becomes more and more different from the level 1 distribution.  Surprisingly, however, there is
no discontinuity between the sixth and seventh task, corresponding with subjects' receipt of feedback
about the outcomes of the first six tasks.   (For the comparison between the distributions of responses to
the sixth and seventh tasks, ?2 = 5.84; the critical value for 95 per cent confidence is 11.1).
Although it is quite clear that subjects are learning something, what they are learning is not so
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obvious.  The frequency of the objectively optimal {p, ¬q} response increases with experience, but there
is no decline in the frequency of positive-confirmation responses, as measured by choice of the q card or
by Ai card combinations.  The main decline is in the frequency of Æ responses.
Table 4 provides additional data about the effect of experience, cross-classifying the 120 subjects
by their card choices in the first and seventh tasks.  (Recall that for each subject, the seventh task is a
repeat of the first.)  Since the numbers in many of the cells of this table are quite small, we must be
cautious is drawing strong conclusions from it; but some features of these data are worth noting.
We shall say that a particular response is stable to the extent that subjects who make that
response in the first task make the same response in the seventh.  A high degree of stability suggests that
the response in question tends to generate reinforcement, that is, feedback which supports the subject’s
belief in the appropriateness of the response.  The most stable response is the objectively optimal {p, ¬q},
which is repeated in 21 out of 27 cases.9  Notice, however, that {p, q} and {p, q, ¬q} also have relatively
high stability; of the 29 subjects who chose one or other of these responses in the first task, 18 still chose
one or the other in the seventh task, while only 6 switched to the objectively optimal reponse.  The
implication seems to be that subjects who initially turn over the q card do not easily learn not to do so.
In contrast, Æ has low stability.  Of the 33 subjects who chose Æ in the first task, only 4 made
the same choice in the seventh, while 17 switched to responses which involved turning over at least one
uninformative card.  This suggests that, even though i is a qualitatively rational response, many of the
subjects who chose it were not Bayesian reasoners.  We shall defer further discussion of the effects of
experience until we have looked at how subjects use information.
9.   Results: positive confirmation bias in true/false judgements
Table 5 cross-classifies the 720 non-repeat cases by the information possessed by the subject after
turning over any cards and by the subject’s true/false judgment.  The rows represent a breakdown of
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cases in terms of the information content of the informative cards <p, #> and <¬q, #>.  The columns
present a breakdown in terms of the uninformative cards turned over, and the true/false judgment.  The
first pair of columns refer to cases in which neither of the uninformative cards was turned over.  The
second pair of columns refer to cases in which <q, #> was turned over and found to be the uninformative
confirmation <q, p>.  The third pair of columns refer to cases in which <q, #> was turned over and
found to be <q, ¬p>.  The final pair of columns contain the few residual cases, i.e. those in which <¬p,
#> was turned over but <q, #> was not.
One striking feature of the data is evident from rows 4 to 8: subjects almost always recognized
the significance of a disconfirmation if they found it (the judgment ‘false’ was made in 152 of the 157
cases in which a disconfirmation was found).  The data in row 9 are equally striking: when subjects had
sufficient evidence to deduce that the statement was true, they again almost always made the correct
judgment (176 cases out of 182).  We shall say that a judgment is deductively correct if its truth can be
established by logical deduction from the information available, and deductively incorrect if its falsity can
be so established.  Our data show that subjects – even those who turned over uninformative cards –
rarely made deductively incorrect judgments.
At the least, these data provide strong evidence that subjects understood the tasks they faced and
applied some form of reasoning to them.  This suggests that the tendency to choose potentially
confirming cards was not due to matching bias (see Section 1.1).  We should not immediately infer that
subjects actually went through the mental processes of deducing the truth or falsity of the statement from
the available information.  But clearly, whatever subjects’ mental processes were, they were highly
effective in those cases in which the statement’s truth or falsity was in fact deducible.
In contrast, some subjects seem to have been rather unsuccessful in assessing the prior
probability that the statement was true.  Of those subjects whose response was Æ, 77 per cent made the
judgment ‘false’, while objectively (for the average pack) the prior probability that the statement is true is
0.64.  We speculate that these subjects did not make systematic use of the opportunity to inspect the pack
29
and so did not realize that cards with p on one side were very likely to have q on the other.  The marked
decline in the frequency of i responses over the course of the experiment suggests that these subjects
gradually learned this property of the pack.
We can test for positive confirmation bias in subjects’ judgments by looking at those subjects
who turned over the q card, and at how their true/false judgments were affected by what they found. 
Table 5 shows that the statement was judged ‘true’ by 74 per cent of the 190 subjects who found the
confirmation <q, p>, but by only 43 per cent of the 51 subjects who found <q, ¬p>.  This difference is
significant at the 99 per cent confidence level (?2 = 17.7, one degree of freedom).10  The implication is
that, for subjects who turn over the q card, confidence in the truth of the statement is increased if the
uninformative confirmation <q, p> is found.  This is exactly what a theory of positive confirmation bias
would predict (see Section 4.2).  Table 6 reports this test, and the corresponding tests for each of the
other three cards.  As one would expect, subjects’ judgments are strongly affected by what they find if
and when they turn over the p and ¬q cards.  No significant effect on judgments can be found for the ¬p
card.
It seems, then, that many subjects are using reasoning processes which generate deductively
correct judgments with a high degree of reliability, but which nevertheless are affected by positive
confirmation bias at both the information-acquisition and the information-using stages.  We now offer
some tentative suggestions as to what those processes might be.
10.  An interpretation of the evidence
Consider the following class of confirmation strategies.  Each such strategy can be described by a pair
(A, v) where A Í S, N(A) is the number of elements in A, and v Î {0, 1, ..., N(A) + 1}.  A person who
follows (A, v) turns over the set of cards A and then makes the judgment ‘true’ if she finds both no
disconfirmation and at least v confirmations.  Otherwise, she makes the judgement ‘false’.  The five
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qualitatively rational strategies can be represented as confirmation strategies: S1 as (Æ, 0), S2 as (Æ, 1),
S3 as ({p}, 0) or ({p}, 1), S4 as ({¬q}, 0), and S5 as ({p, ¬q}, 0) or ({p, ¬q}, 1). 
Now consider four confirmation strategies which are not qualitatively rational: S6 = ({p, q}, 1),
S7 = ({p, q}, 2), S8 = ({p, q, ¬q}, 1) and S9 = ({p, q, ¬q}, 2).  Notice that each of these strategies turns
over a set of cards which was frequently chosen by our subjects, and which includes the uninformative
card q; each strategy also has positive confirmation bias at the judgment stage in that it fails to
discriminate between informative and uninformative confirmations; but each makes the judgment ‘false’
whenever a disconfirmation is found.  All these strategies are sub-optimal by virtue of incurring costs to
acquire objectively valueless information, but their judgments are usually correct.  (For the average pack
of cards, the probability of being correct is 0.84 for S6, 0.744 for S7, 1.0 for S8, and 0.872 for S9; for
comparison, the corresponding probabilities are 0.64 for S1, 0.36 for S2, 0.84 for S3 and S4, and 1.0 for
S5.)  As a way of organizing our data, we offer the hypothesis that most subjects followed one or other of
the strategies S1, ..., S9.  We invite the reader to verify that the data in Tables 3 and 5 are consistent with
this hypothesis.
A subject who uses one of the q-choosing strategies S6, ..., S9 does not make any distinction
between <p, q> and <q, p> at the judgment-making stage.  We speculate that such subjects are unaware
of any difference between these two items of information: each is mentally recorded simply as ‘a
confirmation’.  Recall that, until after the sixth task, subjects receive no feedback on the correctness of
their judgments; but in performing each task, they discover what is on the lower faces of the cards they
turn over.  We suggest that turning over any particular card is psychologically reinforced to the extent
that this action generates information which serves as an input to the subject’s judgment-making process.
For a subject who recognizes the meaning of disconfirmations when she sees them and who
treats confirmations as evidence that the statement is true, the p card always gives reinforcement and the
q and ¬q cards sometimes do.  This pattern of reinforcement may explain why the responses {p, q} and
{p, q, ¬q} had relatively high stability, despite their involving turning over an uninformative card. 
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Similarly, it may explain why the frequency with which each of the cards p, ¬q and (to a lesser extent) q
was chosen increased with subjects’ experience.
As we have said, we were surprised that the feedback provided between the sixth and seventh
task had no significant effect on behaviour.  In retrospect, however, this observation is perhaps
explicable.  Feedback about the correctness of judgments may have little impact on subjects who are
already using strategies which generate correct judgments with high probability.  By the sixth task, most
subjects (95 out of 120) were turning over at least one informative card.  Confirmation strategies which
have this property do usually produce correct judgments.  Thus, subjects do not easily learn that the q
card has no information value.  In effect, that card has a parasitic relationship with the genuinely
informative p card.  Provided that the p card is turned over, confirmations in general are informative; for
a subject who turns over both p and q and who does not distinguish between <p, q> and <q, p>, turning
over q appears to generate useful information for a judgment-making process which is generally
successful.
11 Conclusions
We draw three main conclusions from our research.  First, we have found strong evidence of positive
confirmation bias in the acquisition of information.  This bias has been found in many previous
psychological experiments, but as far as we know, our experiment is the first to use an incentive-
compatible design in which subjects have to pay to acquire information.  The bias that we have found is
incompatible with all recognized versions of Bayesian decision theory.
Second, we have found a new form of positive confirmation bias in the use that is made of
information: information which is interpreted as confirming a hypothesis increases subjects’ confidence in
the truth of the hypothesis, even if, viewed in a Bayesian perspective, that information has no value.  This
new finding throws valuable light on positive confirmation.  It seems that positive confirmation bias is not
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a simple error; rather, it is a manifestation of a pattern of reasoning which, although producing sub-
optimal decisions, is internally coherent.
Third, our findings suggest that positive confirmation bias may have a considerable degree of
robustness to experience.  More precisely, it seems that individuals can learn the value of looking for
potentially disconfirming evidence, but that they persist in seeking confirmations which have no
information value.  We have speculated that this persistence of apparent irrationality might be explained by
a reinforcement theory of learning: given the conceptual framework within which individuals are working,
confirmation-seeking strategies are reinforced.
We began this paper by locating it as a contribution to a larger enterprise – that of studying the
mechanisms by which individuals learn from their experience, and of investigating whether these
mechanisms tend to induce the optimizing behaviour that economics has traditionally assumed. 
Recognizing that what we are about to say may itself be evidence of the bias we have been studying, we
believe that the results of our work provide further confirmation of the value of this enterprise.
Notes
1.  Other forms of confirmation bias have been proposed, for example, the tendency to underweight
disconfirming evidence when interpreting ambiguous information: see Klayman (1995) for a discussion of
different forms of confirmation bias.
2.  In deontic logic, this is equivalent to the permission ‘If condition q¢ is satisfied, then p¢ is permitted’. 
We do not discuss permissions further as they are not used in our experiment.
3.  Pointing out that observations of p and q are capable of disconfirming the hypothesis, Klayman and Ha
suggest that it is misleading to call this heuristic a ‘confirmation bias’; they call it a ‘positive test strategy’.
 We prefer to stick with the established term.  The heuristic can be described naturally in terms of
thinking what properties an observation would need to have in order to confirm the hypothesis positively
(i.e. the conjunction of p and q), and then sampling cases that have the potential to produce such
confirmations.  If the heuristic induces the choice of the uninformative q card in Wason’s selection task,
then in that context it is a bias, relative to uncontroversial principles of rationality.
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4.  We take this to be also the thesis advanced by Oaksford and Chater (1994).  Oaksford and Chater
claim to explain the selection task evidence in terms of Bayesian rationality, but what they in fact do is to
analyse a hypothetical experiment which has a superficial resemblance to the selection task.  In this
experiment, the p, q, ¬p and ¬q cards of the Wason task are selected at random from a pack of double-
sided cards.  The subject is required to judge the truth of the statement « If [p], then [q] », as applied to
all cards in the pack.  For this task, all four cards are informative.
5.  As an example of class of stochastic theories which satisfy within-task contraposition neutrality, we
offer the following model, which originated in the work of Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963), and
which has recently been used by Hey and Orme (1994) to test alternative theories of choice under
uncertainty.  The ‘core’ of the model is some theory of dominance-respecting preferences over lotteries
(e.g. expected utility theory) in which preferences can be represented by a utility function whose domain
is the set of lotteries.  The individual is assumed to maximize the sum of utility and a random disturbance
term, representing error.  We can apply this model to our experiment by assuming that the subject reasons
about probability in a Bayesian fashion, using the relative frequencies of cards in the pack as priors.  The
model then implies that if two strategies have the same utility, they are chosen with the same probability.
6.  For the first question, the subject is asked to read the first part of a cover story which explains how
cards are labelled, is shown a typical four-card layout with one card highlighted, and has to say which
two labels might be on the lower face of that card.  For the second question, the subject sees a typical
statement along with both sides of the four cards in a typical layout; she has to say whether the statement
is true or false.  The third question asks the subject to say how many points she would have scored after
making a particular set of card choices, making a particular judgment, and discovering its truth value. 
These questions were answered correctly at the first attempt in respectively 92 per cent, 94 per cent and
89 per cent of cases.
7.  Cross-task learning might result from analogical reasoning; Gick and Holyoak (1980) give an account
of such reasoning.
8.  In identifying cards, p always refers to the antecedent in the statement and q to the consequent.  Thus,
in variable statement tasks, p refers to a different card label in the two treatments.  For example, in the
case of the Relatives cover story, p refers to «London» in the standard treatment and to «Seattle» in the
contraposed one.
9.  This fact might suggest that a significant minority of our subjects chose {p, 5q} in every task.  In
fact, however, only three subjects did this.
10.  This significance test, and the others reported in Table 6, should be treated with caution, because the
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data points do not all derive from different subjects.  But the overall pattern in the data is unmistakable.
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Appendix: The cover stories
1.  Relatives
A survey is taken of 100 people in Los Angeles, Seattle, London and Norwich who have relatives living in
other cities.  Each person in the survey living in Britain has relatives in Los Angeles or Seattle and each
person living in America has relatives in Norwich or London.  No one has relatives in more than one city. 
The details of the survey are written down on report cards by putting the city each person lives in on one
side of the card and the city their relatives live in on the other side.  A sample of four report cards is
selected.  Look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Standard statement]  Every person in the sample who lives in London also has a relative who lives in Los
Angeles.
[Contraposed statement]  Every person in the sample who lives in Seattle also has a relative who lives in
Norwich.
2.   Drinkers
Only people over the age of eighteen are allowed to drink alcohol in a pub in Britain.  A survey is carried
out of 100 people in a large public house which identifies their age and whether they are drinking alcohol
or a soft drink.  Each person’s details are put down on a report card with the person’s age on one side and
their drinking behaviour on the other.  A sample of four report cards is selected.  To find out if the four
people in the sample are obeying the law, look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Standard statement]  Every person in the sample who is drinking alcohol is also over eighteen.
[Contraposed statement]  Every person in the sample who is under eighteen is also drinking a soft drink.
3.  Rivers
All rivers have either acidic or alkaline water in them.  There is a certain chemical which causes fish in
acidic rivers to be sick.  100 rivers are investigated and the findings are written down on a report card
with whether the river is acidic or alkaline on one side and the health of the fish on the other.  A sample of
four report cards is selected.  To find out if the four rivers in this sample are consistent with their having
this type of chemical in the water, look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Standard statement]  Every river in the sample which is acidic also has sick fish.
[Contraposed statement]  Every river in the sample which has healthy fish also is alkaline.
4.  Objects
[Background]   There is a collection of 100 objects each one of which is either ‘Grue’ or ‘Bleen’.  Also
each object is either ‘Smarge’ or ‘Lall’. Each object is described on a card with ‘Grue’ or ‘Bleen’ written
on one side and ‘Smarge’ or ‘Lall’ written on the other.  A sample of four cards is selected.
[Neutral continuation]  Look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Deontic continuation]  There is a rule which requires that any object which is ‘Grue’ must be ‘Smarge’.
 To find out if the four objects in the sample are obeying the rule look at whichever cards you wish to test
the statement:
[Causal continuation]  There is a group of these objects such that being within this group causes every
‘Grue’ object also to be ‘Smarge’.  To find out if the descriptions of the four objects in the sample are
consistent with their being in this group look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Statement]  Every object in the sample which is ‘Grue’ is also ‘Smarge’.
5.  Diners
[Background]   In a restaurant there are 100 people each of whom makes a drinks and a food order.  Each
person orders either gin or beer and either chips or haddock.  Each order is noted down on a card, by the
waiter, with the drinks order on one side and the food order on the other side.  A sample is taken of orders
for food and drink from four people.
[Neutral continuation]  Look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Deontic continuation]  The restaurant has a strict rule of etiquette which requires that anyone who eats
haddock must drink gin with it. To find out if the four people in the sample are obeying the rule look at
whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Causal continuation]  There is a common eating compulsion which causes anyone who eats haddock to
drink gin.  To find out if the behaviour of the people in the sample is consistent with their having this
compulsion look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Statement]  Every person in the sample who has ordered haddock has also ordered gin.
6.  Meters
[Background]   In a town there are 100 houses all of which have electricity meters.  Each meter is painted
either red or violet and may be either inside or outside the house it serves.  Inspectors note down the
colour of each meter on one side of a report card and its position on the other side.  A sample of four
report cards is selected.
[Neutral continuation]  Look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Deontic continuation]  A planning law has been passed which requires that any meter on the outside of
the house must be red.  To find out if the four households in the sample are obeying the law look at
whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Causal continuation]  There is a form of pollution in a certain area which causes every meter on the
outside of a house to turn red.  To find out if the reports from the four households in the sample are
consistent with their living in this area look at whichever cards you wish to test the statement:
[Statement]  Every meter in the sample which is outside the house it serves is also red.
Table 1 Tasks used in the experiment
cover schema form of realism of
story p q invoked statement story
________________________________________________________________________________
1:  Relatives London   Los Angeles neutral variable realistic
2:  Drinkers alcohol over 18 deontic variable realistic
3:  Rivers acidic sick causal variable realistic
4:  Objects grue smarge variable standard abstract
5:  Diners haddock gin variable standard fanciful
6:  Meters outside red variable standard fanciful
________________________________________________________________________________
Table 2 Cards turned over: summary stasistics
                                             frequency of choices:                                        frequency of choices:                       test of differences
                                             sets of cards                                                      individual cards                                between rows
                                           ______________________                 _______________________________            (see text)
         objectively  qualitatively
task n        optimal      rational p q 5p           5q    ?2
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Relatives 120 26  71 94 43   7 41  2.90
Drinkers 120 67             101 92 18   2 77 46.75**
Rivers 120 29   69 79 46 14 51  7.33
Objects      120      19            68 86 46 13 39  n/a
Diners 120 34  72 91 45   7 52  9.89
Meters 120 35  75 90 43   7 47  8.05
neutral 120 24  66 86 50 12 38  n/a
deontic 120         33  70 91 43   8 49  4.04
causal 120 31  75 90 41   7 51  3.67
1st 120 27  78 74 37   9 39  n/a
2nd 120 28  80 88 36   6 40  5.56
3rd 120 31  73 89 43   8 50  5.99
4th 120 40  76 90 40 12 58  6.29
5th 120 42  71 97 45   7 60 12.79*
6th 120 42  78 94 40   8 60 15.73**
7th 120 41  67                           104 49 10 64 17.88**
total,
excluding 7th  720          210             456                 532            241     50            307
(per cent)                                (29.2)          (63.3)                         (73.9)        (33.5)          (6.9)        (42.6)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
** denotes significance at 99 per cent confidence level
* denotes significance at 95 per cent confidence level
Table 2 Cards turned over: summary stasistics
                                             frequency of choices:                                        frequency of choices:                       test of differences
                                             sets of cards                                                      individual cards                                between rows
                                           ______________________                 _______________________________            (see text)
         objectively  qualitatively
task n        optimal      rational p q 5p           5q    ?2
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Relatives 120 26  71 94 43   7 41  2.90
Drinkers 120 67             101 92 18   2 77 46.75**
Rivers 120 29   69 79 46 14 51  7.33
Objects      120      19            68 86 46 13 39  n/a
Diners 120 34  72 91 45   7 52  9.89
Meters 120 35  75 90 43   7 47  8.05
neutral 120 24  66 86 50 12 38  n/a
deontic 120         33  70 91 43   8 49  4.04
causal 120 31  75 90 41   7 51  3.67
1st 120 27  78 74 37   9 39  n/a
2nd 120 28  80 88 36   6 40  5.56
3rd 120 31  73 89 43   8 50  5.99
4th 120 40  76 90 40 12 58  6.29
5th 120 42  71 97 45   7 60 12.79*
6th 120 42  78 94 40   8 60 15.73**
7th 120 41  67                           104 49 10 64 17.88**
total,
excluding 7th  720          210             456                 532            241     50            307
(per cent)                                (29.2)          (63.3)                         (73.9)        (33.5)          (6.9)        (42.6)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
** denotes significance at 99 per cent confidence level
* denotes significance at 95 per cent confidence level
Table 3 Cards turned over                                  
                                                                                        frequency of choice of set of cards
                                            ________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                           *      *      #      #       *                                      #       *       *      #      # 
             no       p      q    ¬p    ¬q       p      p      p       q     q    ¬p       p       p      p      q    all          Ai sets    f(Ai) sets
                                            cards                                        q    ¬p    ¬q    ¬p    ¬q   ¬q       q       q    ¬p    ¬p  cards        (see       (see
Task                           n                                                                                     ¬p     ¬q    ¬q    ¬q           text)      text)
________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________
Relatives:
  standard   63          5     15      0      0      1     14      3     13      1      0      1      0     10      0      0      0              39            2
  contraposed  57        15      9       3      0      0     13      1     13      0      0      0      0       2      1      0      0              27            1
Drinkers:
  standard  63          7      5       2      0      4       4      1     34      1      0      0       0      5      0      0       0             16            4
  contraposed   57        13      5       1      0      0       4      0     33      0      0      0       0      1      0      0       0             11            0
Rivers:
  standard   63          6    11       2      0      2       8      0     18      2       1      3       1      8      0      0      1             30            5
  contraposed   57        17      4       2      2      0     11      0     11      2       2      0       1      3      0      0      2             21            2
Objects:
  neutral       41         8      6       0      0      0     14      0       4      1       0      1       1      3      1      0       2             24            2
  deontic 32         9      6       0      1      1       5      0       6      0       0      1       1      2      0      0       0             14            3
  causal 47         7    11       0      1      1     10      0       9      0       1      1       0      4      0      1       1             25            4
Diners:
  neutral 38         4      7       2      1      0     10      0       8      2       0      1       0      3      0      0       0            22            2
  deontic   42       10      4       0      0      0       6      0     14      0       0      0       2      6      0      0       0            18            0
  causal 40         8      5       0      0      0       6      1     12      0       1      0       0      7      0      0       0            18            0
Meters:
  neutral 41       12      5       1      0      0       6      0     12      1       0      0       1      3      0      0       0            16            0
  deontic 46         4      7       2      0      0     11      1     13      1       0      0       1      6      0      0       0            27            0
  causal        33         8      4       0      0      0       7      0     10      1       0      0       0      2      1      0       0            13            1
1st                        120       33    15       4      2      3     22      2     27      3       0      1       0      7      0      0       1            48           6
2nd                           120       29    22      0       1      1     25      1     28      0       0      1       2      9      1      0       0            58           4
3rd                 120       18    20      3       0      4     26      1     31      2       1      2       0      9      1      1       1            58           8
4th                 120       22    14      4       0      0     17      1     40      2       0      2       2    11      1      0       4            48           3
5th                 120       14    14      2       1      1     25      1     42      0       3      2       3    12      0      0       0            56           4
6th                 120       17    19      2       1      0     14      1     42      5       1      0       1    17      0      0       0            53           1
7th                 120       10    16      1       0      0     25      1     41      2       3      0       1    14      3      0       3            57           3
total, excluding  7th   720     133  104    15       5      9   129      7   210    12       5      8       8    65       3      1       6         321          26
_______________________________________________________________________________
Note:  Ai sets are marked by *; f(Ai) sets are marked by #.
Table 4 Consistency between first and seventh task
                                 response to seventh task
                                                   ______________________________________
       response to first task i        {p}    {p, q}  {p,5q}  {p, q,5q}    other total
        __________________________________________________________________________  
       i 4 5 9 7 2 6 33        
        {p} 1 4 2 6 1 1 15
       {p, q} 2           3         10 3 4 0 22
       {p, 5q} 0 1 0         21 3 2 27
       {p, q, 5q} 0 0 0           3 4 0   7
       other 3 3 4 1 0 5 16
       total                        10         16         25         41         14         14                       120
       __________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5 True/false judgments
         uninformative cards turned over, and judgment made
                                      _________________________________________________________
  neither <q, #> <5p, #> but
                          nor <5p, #>        <q, p>          <q, 5p>              not <q, #>
informative cards ____________     __________         __________            ___________
turned over                true  false    true  false        true     false true     false
____________________________________________________________________________
1. none     31     102      16    5          2       4  4 1
2. <p, q> only     65   16      85    6        13       7    6 1
3.  <5q,5p> only       3    4        2    1          0       0    7 0
4.  <p, 5q> only             0       23        1  20                 0       5  0 0
5.  <5q, p> only            0       2        0    2          1       0  0 1
6. <p, q> and <5q, p>          1   38        1    4          0       8    0 1
7. <p, 5q> and <5q, p>       0   11        0    3          0       0    0 1
8. <p,5q> and <5q,5p>        1   22        0    8                 0       2    0 1
9. <p, q> and <5q,5p>    134    3       36    0          6       3    0 0
total    235  221     141  49        22     29             17 6
(per cent true)                 (51.5)         (74.2)          (43.1)           (73.9)
____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6 Effects of information on judgment     
number of subjects
judging:
information true   false         ?2
________________________________________________
<p, q> 347  87
<p, 5q>       2  96 215.1**
<q, p> 141  49
<q, 5p>    22  29   17.7**
<5p, q>       7    7
<5p, 5q>    27    9     2.90
<5q, p>       3  71
<5q, 5p> 189  44 142.4**
______________________________________________
** denotes significance at 99 per cent confidence level
* denotes significance at 95 per cent confidenced level
